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This paper estimates the effects on energy and oil demand of changes in income and oil prices, 
for 96 of the world’s largest countries, in per-capita terms.  We examine three important issues: 
the asymmetric effects on demand of increases and decreases in oil prices; the asymmetric 
effects on demand of increases and decreases in income; and the different speeds of demand 
adjustment to changes in price and in income.  Its main conclusions are the following: (1) OECD 
demand responds much more to increases in oil prices than to decreases; ignoring this 
asymmetric price response will bias downward the estimated income elasticity; (2) demand’s 
response to income decreases in many non-OECD countries is not necessarily symmetric to its 
response to income increases; ignoring this asymmetric income response will bias the estimated 
income elasticity; (3) the speed of demand adjustment is faster to changes in income than to 
changes in price; ignoring this difference will bias upward the estimated response to income 
changes.   Using correctly specified equations for energy and oil demand, the long-run elasticity 
for increases in income is about 0.55 for OECD energy and oil, and 1.0 or higher for Non-OECD 
Oil Exporters, Income Growers and perhaps all Non-OECD countries.  These income elasticity 
estimates are significantly higher than current estimates used by the US Department of Energy.  
Our estimates for the OECD countries are also higher than those estimated recently by 
Schmalensee-Stoker-Judson (1998) and Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995), who ignore the 
asymmetric effects of prices on demand.   Higher income elasticities, of course, will increase 
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I Introduction 
 
This paper analyses the determinants of commercial  energy and oil demand, for 96 of the 
world’s largest countries (listed in Appendix A), using 1971-97 data on a per-capita basis.  Our 
primary interest is estimating the long-run income elasticity of demand.  This parameter has 
important implications for future energy and oil demand, and for emissions levels for carbon 
dioxide and other pollutants – not to mention its effect on the future prices of oil and other forms 
of energy.  However, estimation of this parameter is relatively sensitive to the assumed 
specification of demand as a function of income and price.  We are especially interested in 
whether there are: 
•  asymmetric effects on demand between increases and decreases in price 
•  asymmetric effects on demand between increases and decreases in income 
•  differences in the speed of demand adjustment for changes in price and for 
changes in income 
•  differences across countries and various groups of countries. 
To address these issues, we examine various specifications of the demand equation for various 
groups of countries.   
The paper was motivated by several articles in the literature whose income-elasticity 
estimates for energy or for the closely associated carbon emissions appear too low, and even 
negative in some cases – namely Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson (SSJ, 1998), Judson, 
Schmalensee, and Stoker (JSS, 1999) and Holtz-Eakin and Selden (HS, 1995).   For the highest-
income (OECD) countries, SSJ (1998) estimated income-elasticities are substantially below the 
0.55 level that we estimate for the OECD in this paper; in fact, their estimates were not even 
positive: SSJ (1998) estimate an income elasticity of –0.30 for carbon emissions and –0.22 for 
energy.  As for HES (1995), although they do not report elasticities, their estimated coefficients 
suggest an income elasticity of 0.36 for the highest-income countries considered by SSJ (1998). 
Another motivation was provided by demand projections by the US Department of 
Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) that used income elasticities that were 
extremely low, for the developing countries especially
1.  For example, they used an income 
elasticity of about 0.65 for energy and oil in Asian Developing Countries excluding China.    
Our conclusions are the following: 
•  the long-run income elasticity of energy and oil is about 0.5 for the OECD countries and 
approximately 1.0 for the Non-OECD countries; 
•  demand has responded more to increases than to decreases in price, not only in the 
developed OECD countries and also in many developing countries; wrongly assuming 
that demand is perfectly price-reversible (i.e. symmetry between the effects of increases 
and decreases in price), or omitting price entirely, will bias downward the estimated 
income elasticity
2;   
•  demand has responded more to increases in income than to decreases in income, for some 
groups of countries such as the Non-OECD Oil Exporters; wrongly assuming that 
demand is perfectly income-reversible (i.e. symmetry between the effects of increases 
and decreases in income) can bias downward the estimated income elasticity; 
                                                            
1   See International Energy Outlook 2000. 
2   See also Gately (1992, 1993), Dargay-Gately (1995a, 1995b) 
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•  the speed of adjustment to changes in price is slower than to changes in income; 
•  there are important differences across countries, not only between the developed OECD 
countries and the Non-OECD countries, but also among several Non-OECD sub-groups: 
the Oil Exporting countries, the Growing Income countries, and the Other Countries; this 
heterogeneity characterizes countries’ experience with regard to the rate of income 
growth and its variability over time, as well as the relationship between income growth 
and the demand for energy and oil. 
 
  The outline of the paper is as follows.  In Section II we describe important features of the 
data, namely: the fundamental influence of income growth upon the demand for energy and oil; 
the asymmetric effects on demand of price increases and decreases; the asymmetric effects on 
demand of income growth and decline; and the substantial heterogeneity across countries, not 
only between the OECD and the Non-OECD countries but also among the Non-OECD countries 
themselves.  In Section III we describe the various specifications of the demand equations that 
we shall examine.  Section IV presents the econometric results for these alternative specifications 
of the demand for energy and for oil, for several groups of countries: for the OECD countries, for 
the Non-OECD countries, and then for three sub-groups within the Non-OECD countries whose 
behavior differs substantially from each other: the Oil Exporters, the Income Growers (those 
developing countries with the fastest income growth), and the Other Countries.  Section V 
summarizes our conclusions. 
  
II. Background  Issues 
 
Important Determinants of the Growth of Energy and Oil Demand:  
Income and Price, and Heterogeneity across countries 
 
We assume that a country’s per-capita energy and oil demand are determined by changes in 
income and price.  These effects on demand may be asymmetric.  That is, the demand-reducing 
effect of price increases may not necessarily be completely reversed by a comparable reduction 
in price.  Likewise, the demand-increasing effect of an increase in income may not necessarily be 
completely reversed by a comparable decrease in income. 
In several graphs below, we illustrate important phenomena that we shall attempt to capture 
in our econometric modeling. 
•  The role of income growth is illustrated by Figure 1, which shows the 1971-97 time-paths 
of per-capita energy and oil demand vs. per-capita income, for five large Asian countries.  
We see that their energy and oil demand increased about as fast as income over this 
period. 
•  The asymmetric effects on demand of increases and decreases in the price of oil are 
illustrated by Figure 2, which shows similar time-paths for three large OECD countries: 
Italy, Japan, and the USA.  We see that the demand reductions caused by the oil price 
increases of the 1970’s are not reversed by the oil price decreases of the 1981-86 period. 
•  The asymmetric effects on demand of changes in income are illustrated in Figure 3, 
which shows time-paths for three countries whose incomes have decreased for some or 
all of the 1971-97 period: Saudi Arabia, Bulgaria, and Zaire.  We see that the demand-
increasing effects of income increases are not simply reversed by the effects of income 
decreases.   4 
 


































The top graph of Figure 1 depicts the 1971-97 time-paths of per-capita energy demand 
against per-capita income (moving left to right, with increasing income), for five large Asian 
countries.    The bottom graph shows the analogous time-paths for per-capita oil demand.  In 
each graph, the scales are logarithmic -- which allows for order-of-magnitude differences among 
countries, and which facilitates growth-rate comparisons across countries and between energy [or 
oil] growth and income growth.  Movement parallel to the diagonal lines indicates equi-
proportional growth in energy and income; steeper [less steep] movement indicates that energy is 
growing faster [slower] than income.  For example, in the top graph we see that South Korea had 
the fastest income growth (greatest horizontal movement) and that its energy demand increased 
as fast as its income (movement parallel to the equi-proportional lines).  China’s energy demand 
grew more slowly than its income, while Bangladesh’s energy demand grew faster than its 
income.   5 
























In similar graphs, Figure 2 shows the 1971-97 time-paths of energy (and oil) demand 
versus income, for three large OECD countries: the USA, Japan, and Italy.  These graphs, 
especially the lower graph for oil, also show indirectly the asymmetric effects of oil price 
increases (in 1973-74 and 1979-80) and subsequent price decreases during the1980s.
3  The effect 
of the oil price increases, especially after 1979-80, was to sharply reduce oil demand.  Yet when 
these price increases were almost completely reversed in the mid-1980s, the oil demand 




                                                            
3  Oil price, 1971-97, is shown in Figure 5 below, in logarithmic form.   6 










































Figure 3 illustrates, for three Non-OECD countries, the possibility that income growth 
and decline can have asymmetric effects on demand.  For Saudi Arabia, we see that in the 1970s 
demand grew together with (and often faster than) income, but the subsequent income declines in 
the 1980s did not reverse the demand growth of the 1970s.  In Bulgaria the opposite happened: 
income grew in the 1970’s but energy and oil demand were flat; subsequent income declines in 
the 1980s caused energy demand to decline at the same rate as income, and caused oil demand to 
decline even faster than income
4.  Finally, for Zaire we see the dismal decline in income (right-
to-left movement) from 1971 to 1997 accompanied by almost no reduction in energy or oil 
demand. 
 
                                                            
4   Strictly speaking, this decline in oil demand in the final decade might better be described as caused by a decline 
in oil exports from the Former Soviet Union.   7 
  In Figures 1-3, we have shown the 1971-97 time-paths of energy and oil demand versus 
income, for a total of eleven countries.  These graphs have illustrated the heterogeneity of 
experience across countries in a variety of dimensions: in their income growth, both the average 
rate of growth and its volatility over time, as well as in the relationship of demand growth to 
changes in income and to changes in price.  To summarize the relationship between the growth 
of income and the growth of energy and oil demand for all countries, we plot in Figure 4 each 
country’s energy and oil demand growth rates versus their income growth rates.  The names and 
3-letter abbreviations of the 96 countries appear in Appendix A.  The OECD countries are 
plotted in the two graphs on the left, and the Non-OECD countries in the two graphs on the right.  
The top graphs plot countries’ energy growth rate on the vertical scale and their income growth 
rate on the horizontal.  Similarly for the two bottom graphs: oil growth rate on the vertical, and 
income growth rate on the horizontal.  The scales on all four graphs are the same: ranging from  
–5% to +10% annual growth. 
  The OECD countries all had relatively similar rates of income growth of about 2% 
annually, with the rates ranging between 1% and 4%.  But the Non-OECD countries had widely 
different rates of income growth.  Several Asian countries had income growth of 5% or greater: 
South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and China.  In contrast, several other 
countries experienced negative growth: Zaire, Angola, Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti, Saudi 
Arabia, Nigeria, Jamaica, and Venezuela. 
  There were also importance differences across countries in the relationship between 
energy growth and income growth, and between oil growth and income growth.  In the simplest 
case, if energy (or oil) demand were growing at the same rate as income, a country’s point would 
be plotted on the 45-degree line: the energy (oil) growth rate would be the same as the income 
growth rate.  The closest to that case would be the upper left graph, OECD energy vs. income 
growth, where many of the points are close to the 45-degree line; only a few are far removed, 
with energy growth much lower than income growth: Ireland, Norway, Japan, Great Britain, 
Denmark, and the USA.  In the lower left graph, OECD oil vs. income growth, most of the 
countries had oil demand growth rates considerably lower than their income growth rates, and 
many had negative growth rates for oil demand, reflecting the demand reductions in response to 
the two price shocks of the 1970s.  Those countries whose oil demand grew as rapidly as their 
income were those that started at the lowest income levels in the OECD: Portugal, Greece, 
Mexico, Turkey, and Spain. 
  The Non-OECD countries exhibited much greater heterogeneity, not only in their rates of 
income growth but also in the relationship between their energy (or oil) growth rates and their 
income growth rates.  Although some countries’ energy and income growth rates were similar 
(e.g., Singapore at 7%, Tunisia at 3%, Chile at 2%, Cote d’Ivoire at –1.5%), there were many 
more countries whose energy growth rates were much greater than their income growth rates.  
Some had negative income growth but positive growth in energy demand, such as Saudi Arabia, 
Nigeria, Haiti, and Angola.  Others had positive rates of income growth but negative growth in 
energy demand: Romania, Kenya, Congo, Sudan, and Tanzania.  Similarly heterogeneous were 
the Non-OECD countries’ relationships between oil demand growth and income growth: 
countries with virtually no income growth had oil demand growth that ranged from about +5% 
(Nigeria) to -5% (Trinidad & Tobago). 
  This heterogeneity, within the Non-OECD especially, will frustrate our efforts to use a 
standard econometric specification.  We address this difficulty below, by clustering the Non-  8 
OECD countries into three groups that are somewhat more homogeneous: the Oil Exporters, the 




Figure 4.  Energy and Oil Demand Growth vs. Income Growth:  





























































































OECD: Energy vs. Income growth






























































































































































Non-OECD: Energy vs. Income growth
Non-OECD: Oil vs. Income growth  9 
III. Demand  Model 
 
Data: Sources and Units 
•  Income, 1971-97: Real GDP per capita in constant dollars (Chain Index), expressed in 
international prices, base 1985.  Sources: Data for 1971-92 from Penn World Tables 5.6.  
Data for 1993-97 calculated from growth rates of deflated PPP per-capita income data 
from World Bank, 1999 World Development Indicators. 
•  Energy Consumption, 1971-97: Total Final Consumption of “modern”, commercial 
energy only (excluding “Combustible Renewables and Waste”: traditional biomass fuels 
such as wood) in tons of oil-equivalent per person; Source: International Energy Agency.   
•  Oil Consumption, 1971-97: Total Final Consumption of oil products plus Oil used in 
Transformation (e.g. for electricity generation) in tons per person; Source: International 
Energy Agency.   
•  Population 1971-97, US Census Bureau, International Data Base, Table 1 
www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html 
•  Price of international crude oil, 1971-97: US Dept. of Energy, Energy Information 
Administration, Refiner Acquisition Real Cost of Imported Crude Oil, 1992$/barrel 
 
Definitions 
Dct  log of per-capita demand, either energy or oil, in country c in year t. 
Yct  log of real per-capita GDP, in country c in year t 
Pt  log of real price of oil 
 
Model Specification    
Various specifications shall be examined for the demand for energy (or oil), and the results 
presented and compared.  This approach addresses the heterogeneity across countries and the 
likelihood that some specifications will be more appropriate for some groups of countries than 
for others.  It also takes account of an important conclusion from the surveys by Dahl (1991, 
1993, 1994), that the estimated income and price elasticities are dependent upon the specification 
chosen.  
The simplest specification makes current demand a log-linear function only of current 
income: 
(1) Dt  = k + γY t  
A second specification would allow demand to be determined by current and past values 
of income, in which the weights for past values of income decline geometrically.  Such a 
specification, commonly called a Koyck-lag equation, is equivalent to the following function of 
current income and lagged demand: 
 (2)  Dt  = k + γY t + θ D t-1 
We expect that the lagged-demand coefficient θ would have a value between 0 and 1.  The 
implied speed of adjustment to changes in income, measured by 1- θ, could range from 
instantaneous (when θ = 0) to very slow (when θ approaches 1). 
A similar Koyck-lag model could also assume that demand is determined by both income  10 
  
and price
5 together with lagged demand
6: 
 (3)  Dt  = k + βP t + γY t + θ D t-1 
This specification assumes that the effects of past price levels decline geometrically, and at the 
same rate as the effects of past income levels.  That is, the speed of demand adjustment (1-θ) is 
the same for changes in price and for changes in income. 
  Since it not necessarily true that the speed of demand adjustment to changes in price 
would be the same as the speed of demand adjustment to changes in income, we also consider a 




(4)  D t  = k * (1- θp) * (1- θy)  +  (θp + θy) * D t-1  - (θp*θy) * D t-2 
  +   β P t  -  θy β Pt-1  +  γ Yt   -  θp γ Yt-1 
 
More complicated specifications of the demand equation take account of two important 
phenomena: 
•  imperfect price-reversibility: the demand response to a price increase is not completely 
reversed by an equivalent price decrease; 
•  imperfect income-reversibility: the demand response to an income increase is not 
completely reversed by an equivalent income decrease. 
 
The phenomenon of imperfect price-reversibility has been analyzed extensively, initially 
by Dargay and Gately; see Dargay (1992), Gately (1992, 1993), Dargay and Gately (1994 , 
1995a, 1995b), Gately and Streifel (1997), Walker and Wirl (1993), and Haas and Schipper 
(1998).  The basic idea is that higher energy prices induced investment in more energy-efficient 
equipment and retrofitting of existing capital, such as greater insulation.  But when prices fell, 
the response was not to reverse this retrofitting or to switch back to less energy-efficient capital -
- although there may well have been more intensive usage, such as driving more miles or 
adjusting thermostats to more comfortable levels.  Thus, the responses to price increases and 
decreases could potentially be 
                                                            
5   It would be preferable to have refined petroleum prices for the oil equations and delivered energy prices for the 
energy equations for each country.  However, this data is unavailable for most countries, especially in the 
developing world.  Analysts frequently ignore all prices when  pooling data from many countries; instead they 
employ year-dummy variables that could incorporate energy prices, but could also represent technology and other 
time-dependent events.  Rather than ignore prices altogether, we will include the world price of oil as an important 
independent variable in estimating energy and oil demands.  Since delivered oil and energy prices are unavailable 
for most countries, we apply the consistent treatment that the world crude oil price is the primary price variable of 
interest in our specifications. 
 
6  This specification is closest to the one whose results are most commonly reported in Pesaran et al. (1998). 
 
7  Such a specification is described in Johnston (1984), equation 9-14, page 347.   11 
quite different.
8   
 In this approach, instead of using the logarithm of price in the demand equation, the 
following three-way decomposition of  the logarithm of price has been substituted: the 
cumulating series of increases in the maximum historical price, the cumulating series of price 
cuts, and the cumulating series of price recoveries (sub-maximum increases in price).  In this 
paper we use the following: 
Decomposition of  Pt, the log of price 
(i) Pt  = P1 + Pmax, t + Pcut, t + Prec, t    ; 
where P1 = log of price in starting year t=1, which is 1971 
Pmax, t = cumulative increases in log of maximum historical price; 
  monotonically  non-decreasing:  Pmax, t ≥ 0 
Pcut, t = cumulative decreases in log of price; 
  monotonically  non-increasing:  Pcut, t ≤ 0 
Prec, t  = cumulative sub-maximum increases in log of price; 
  monotonically  non-decreasing:  Prec, t  ≥ 0 
The following graph depicts the (log) price of oil and its decomposition into three price series. 
 
Figure 5.  Decomposition of the Logarithm of Price 
 
                                                            
8  Observed asymmetries in the oil demand response to the world crude oil price could technically be due to 
various reasons:  (1) there is asymmetry between demand and delivered prices, and/or (2) there is asymmetry 
between a country’s delivered oil prices and the world crude price.  Similarly, asymmetry in energy demand could 
be in its response to price or in the response of delivered fuel prices to the world crude oil price.  Although price 
controls, taxes, and alternative fuel mixes could all complicate this story, we believe that it is essential to include a 
price variable, no matter how imperfect, to adequately test the hypotheses of interest. 
 
 
































































P 1  12 
It has also been argued that the demand effects of changes in income are not necessarily 
perfectly reversible, which most demand equations assume implicitly.  The hypothesis of 
imperfectly income-reversible demand is suggested in Dargay-Gately (1995a, Figure 19), in 
which the effects on demand of income increases are not symmetric to the effects of income 
decreases.  Possible explanations for such asymmetry include the following.  Some sectors may 
expand more strongly than others when the economy grows, while other sectors may decline 
more strongly than others when the economy contracts; these sectors may have different energy 
intensities.  In addition, even when incomes decline in many developing countries, the process of 
urbanization may continue, requiring a continuing shift from traditional biomass fuels toward 
modern, commercial fuels 
To examine this possibility we use an approach analogous to our price decomposition.  
We decompose the logarithm of per-capita income into three component series: the cumulating 
series of increases in maximum income, the cumulating series of income declines, and the 
cumulating series of income recoveries (sub-maximum increases in income), as follows: 
Decomposition of the Yt , the log of per-capita income 
(ii) Yt  =  Y1+ Ymax, t + Ycut, t + Yrec, t    ; 
 where  Y1 = log of GDP in year t=1, which is 1971 
 Y max, t = cumulative increases in log of maximum historical per-capita GDP; 
  monotonically  non-decreasing:  Ymax, t ≥ 0 
 Y cut, t = cumulative decreases in log of per-capita GDP; 
  monotonically  non-increasing:  Ycut, t ≤ 0 
Yrec, t  = cumulative sub-maximum increases in log of per-capita GDP; 
  Monotonically  non-decreasing:  Yrec, t  ≥ 0 
The following graph depicts the log of per-capita income for Saudi Arabia and its three-way 
decomposition. 
Figure 6.  Decomposition of the Logarithm of Per-capita Income 
 
Combining the decomposition of price (i) and the decomposition of income (ii) into equation (4) 
gives us the following equation:



































































rec  13 
 (5)  D t  = k0 * (1- θp) * (1- θy)  +  (θp + θy) * D t-1  - (θp*θy) * D t-2 
  +   k pP 1  + βmPmax, t + βcPcut, t + βrPrec, t   
  -   θy * (kpP1 + βmPmax, t-1 + βcPcut, t-1 + βrPrec, t-1 ) 
  +   k yY 1 + γmYmax, t +γcYcut, t + γrYrec, t   
- θp* ( kyY1  + γmYmax, t-1 +γcYcut, t-1 + γrYrec, t-1  ) 
where k0, kpP1, and kyY1 are constants that become combined with the other constants to form a 
single constant k: 
 (5a)  D t  = k +  (θp + θy) * D t-1  - (θp*θy) * D t-2 
  +   βmPmax, t + βcPcut, t + βrPrec, t   
  -   θy * ( βmPmax, t-1 + βcPcut, t-1 + βrPrec, t-1 ) 
  +   γmYmax, t +γcYcut, t + γrYrec, t   
- θp* ( γmYmax, t-1 +γcYcut, t-1 + γrYrec, t-1  ) 
 
In the econometric results below, we use pooled cross-section/time-series data for various groups 
of countries, using energy (or oil) demand for each country, income for each country, and the 
price of oil, with a separate constant estimated for each country – what is called a “fixed effects” 
model.
9  In the most general specification, in which both income and price are decomposed and 
the lagged-adjustment coefficients for income and price are estimated separately, we estimate the 
following regression: 
(6)  D c,t  = k1c +  (θp + θy) * D c,t-1  - (θp*θy) * D c,t-2 
  +   βmPmax, t + βcPcut, t + βrPrec, t   
  -   θy * ( βmPmax, t-1 + βcPcut, t-1 + βrPrec, t-1 ) 
  +   γmYmax, t +γcYcut, t + γrYrec, t   
- θp* ( γmYmax, t-1 +γcYcut, t-1 + γrYrec, t-1  ) 
where k1c are the constants for the individual countries and the other parameters are the same 
across countries. 
 
The following can be said about the lagged-adjustment coefficients: 
θp lagged price coefficient;    0 ≤ θp ≤ 1  
1-θp is the speed of adjustment to changes in P; 
 if  θp= 0: adjustment to price change is instantaneous; no lag 
θy  lagged income coefficient; 0 ≤ θy ≤ 1  
1-θy is the speed of adjustment to changes in Y; 
 if  θy= 0: adjustment to income change is instantaneous; no lag 
Normally we would expect the price-lag coefficient to be larger than the income-lag coefficient; 
that is, we expect that demand adjusts more slowly to price changes than to income changes: 
 0  ≤ θy ≤ θp ≤ 1 
 
With regard to the price coefficients, we expect that: 
βm < 0 demand response to change in Pmax 
βc   < 0 demand response to change in Pcut ; note that Pcut < 0 
βr   < 0 demand response to change in Prec  
Normally we would expect that, in absolute values,  βc < βr  < βm  
 
With regard to the income coefficients, we expect that: 
                                                            
9   See Hsaio (1986).   14 
γm > 0 demand response to change in Ymax  
γc  > 0 demand response to change in Ycut; note that Ycut < 0 
γr  > 0 demand response to change in Yrec 
Normally we would expect the relative values to be  γc  <  γr  <  γm   
That is, we expect demand to rise more rapidly when income rises than it would decrease when 
income falls, and rise most rapidly when a new maximum income is reached. 
 
 
IV. Econometric  Results 
Next we summarize the econometric results for the various specifications of the demand 
equations for energy and oil, for several regions.  First we present results for the OECD 
countries, and then for the Non-OECD countries.  Given substantial heterogeneity within the 
Non-OECD countries, as suggested by Figure 4 above, we then present results for more 
homogenous clusters of countries: the Oil Exporters, the Income Growers (developing countries 
with income growth exceeding 2% per annum), and then for the Other Countries. 
  As noted above, we emphasize the effects of alternative specifications upon the income 
and price elasticities; this is an important result from the surveys by Dahl (1991, 1993, 1994).  
We shall illustrate this for each of the regions, describing in detail the estimated elasticities that 
result from alternative functional specifications.
 10 
IV.1 OECD  Countries 
Table 1.  OECD Countries’ Results 
Notes:  i)  A shaded cell indicates a coefficient that was not statistically significant. 
(ii)  The equation # listed above correspond to the equation # described in Section III above.  The letter “a” 
following an equation number (e.g. 3a) indicates an asymmetric response was allowed, via 
decomposition of price and/or income. 
(iii)  When price or income is decomposed, we performed a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the three 
coefficients are equal.  Below those coefficients we indicate whether the equality hypothesis was 
rejected or not rejected, using a 5% cutoff for the F-statistic probability. 
(iv)  Long-run income elasticity was calculated as  γ / (1- θy); similarly for price. When income [price] is 
decomposed, the long-run elasticity for income [price] refers to changes in Ymax [Pmax].  
(v)  The Sums of Squared Residuals are not comparable between Energy and Oil because different units 
were used in the regressions: tons for Energy and Thousand Barrels/Day for Oil. 
                                                            
10 As noted by Pesaran (1998, p.66), there appears little point in applying unit root and cointegration tests on annual 
time series that span such a short period.  The literature establishes the low power of these tests in small samples.   
fuel eq. Y Ymax Ycut Yrec P Pmax Pcut Prec Income Price
energy 2 0.078 0.86 0.57 0.9958 1.0189
energy 3 0.052 -0.027 0.39 -0.20 0.9961 0.9321
energy 3a 0.151 -0.041 -0.014 -0.039 1.28 -0.35 0.9963 0.8924
energy 6 0.588 -0.025 -0.014 -0.015 0.00 0.90 0.59 -0.24 0.9967 0.7959
oil 2 0.032 0.90 0.31 0.9884 1.8220
oil 3 -0.016 -0.054 -0.18 -0.59 0.9907 1.4597
oil 3a 0.158 -0.076 -0.036 -0.078 1.48 -0.71 0.9913 1.3600





















Elasticity  15 
OECD: Energy Demand 
Using a Koyck-lag equation with only income and lagged demand (equation 2), the income 
elasticity is 0.57.  Also including price, a standard Koyck-lag equation (3), with price, income, 
and lagged demand, the income elasticity falls to 0.39.   
If we allow demand to be imperfectly price-reversible (equation 3a), not only do we see the 
coefficients for price increases to be much larger than for price decreases, but also we see that 
the income elasticity is increased significantly, to 1.28.   However, this estimate seems 
implausibly large. 
When adjustment coefficients for both price and income are estimated separately as in 
equation (6) (results not shown in Table 1), the income adjustment coefficient is estimated to be 
negative but not significantly different from zero.  With a modified version of equation (6) that 
estimates an adjustment coefficient only for price (with a zero coefficient for adjustment to 
income changes, i.e. instantaneous adjustment), the resulting income elasticity is 0.59, with a  
price elasticity of –0.24.  This is the preferred specification
11, equation (6). 
Thus, if the economy grows by 3% per annum, energy demand will grow by 1.8% per 
annum, and energy intensity will decline by 1.2% per annum if energy prices do not change.  
This long-term trend toward decreasing energy intensity is sometimes called by energy modelers 
the economy’s “autonomous energy efficiency improvement, AEEI”.  It is autonomous in their 
models because it is unrelated to energy price movements.  In fact, it could be due to trends in 
technology or in the structural mix of the economy, or other factors that have not included.   
These OECD energy results can be contrasted with results of others such the energy and 
climate change estimates of SSJ (1998), JSS (1999), and HS (1995).  Due to the unavailability of 
a full set of international energy prices, these authors ignore price entirely and allow time-effects 
to capture the complex asymmetric effects of prices and other factors.  For the highest-income 
(OECD) countries, their estimated income elasticities are substantially below the 0.55 level that 
we estimate for the OECD in this paper.  In fact, their estimates are not even positive: SSJ (1998) 
estimate an income elasticity of –0.30 for carbon emissions and –0.22 for energy.  Although HS 
(1995) does not report elasticities, their estimated coefficients for carbon emissions imply an 
income elasticity of 0.36 for the highest-income countries.
12 Projections with such elasticities 
would allow for unwarranted optimism that demand would barely grow for the richest countries. 
 
 
OECD: Oil Demand 
With a simple specification with income and lagged price, the income elasticity is 0.31.  
However, when price is also included, equation (3), the income elasticity becomes negative, 
although not statistically significant.   This would indeed be a puzzling result, that OECD oil 
demand would decrease when OECD income increased. 
To resolve this puzzle, we allow demand to be imperfectly price-reversible (equation 3a).  
The resulting decomposed price coefficients indicate that price increases have a much greater 
                                                            
11  Decomposing income as well as price is not warranted.  When such an equation was estimated, a Wald test could 
not reject the hypothesis that the income coefficients are equal. 
 
12 Since these studies ignore price, they do not incorporate any lagged adjustment terms.  Energy demand and carbon 
emissions are functions of country intercept terms, time intercepts, and income which enters the equation 
nonlinearly.  SSJ (1998) estimates a 10-knot piece-wise-linear spline function; HS (1995) use a polynomial function 
with income and income squared terms.  HS (1995) adjusts for autocorrelation, but SSJ (1998) does not . 
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impact on demand than do price decreases; a Wald test of the hypothesis that these three 
coefficients were equal allowed us to reject the hypothesis.  Moreover, the income coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant – although the income elasticity of 1.48 is implausibly large. 
When adjustment coefficients for both price and income are estimated, in equation (6), the 
income adjustment coefficient was estimated to be positive, although not significantly different 
from zero.  The resulting income elasticity is 0.56.  Again there was clear evidence of imperfect 
price-reversibility: a Wald test allowed us to reject the hypothesis that the price coefficients were 
equal.   Decomposing income as well as price was not warranted: a Wald test could not reject the 
hypothesis that the income coefficients are equal (results not shown). 
The preferred specification is equation (6).  The long-run price elasticity is –0.64, which is 
substantially above energy’s response to price.  Its long-run income elasticity is 0.56.  Thus, if 
the economy grows by 3% per annum, oil demand will grow by 1.65% per annum, and oil 
intensity will decline by 1.35% per annum if price does not change.   
 
These results confirm our conjecture that wrongly assuming that demand is perfectly price-
reversible will bias downward the income elasticity.  They also help to explain other estimates of 
income elasticities of demand for energy and oil in the literature that are much smaller, and 
sometimes even negative, when the price effect is ignored for the richest countries. 
  
  
IV.2 Non-OECD  Countries 
Table 2.  Non-OECD Countries’ Results 
 
 
Notes:  see Table 1. 
 
fuel eq. Y Ymax Ycut Yrec P Pmax Pcut Prec Income Price
energy 1 0.859 0.86 0.9726 99.418
energy 2 0.159 0.84 0.86 0.9942 20.943
energy 3 0.166 -0.026 1.02 -0.16 0.9943 20.683
energy 3a 0.185 0.156 0.307 -0.028 -0.005 0.002 1.11 -0.17 0.9944 20.391
energy 4 0.444 -0.019 0.00 0.88 0.44 -0.16 0.9943 20.542
energy 6 0.521 0.482 0.307 -0.008 -0.012 0.026 0.00 0.86 0.52 -0.01 0.9943 20.344
oil 1 0.720 0.72 0.9755 81.129
oil 2 0.151 0.82 0.72 0.9934 21.755
oil 3 0.153 -0.029 0.84 -0.16 0.9935 21.438
oil 3a 0.179 0.150 0.220 -0.048 -0.001 0.018 1.01 -0.27 0.9936 21.230
oil 6 0.530 0.455 0.068 -0.028 -0.008 0.037 0.00 0.84 0.53 -0.18 0.9935 21.248
cannot reject equality reject equality
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Non-OECD: Energy Demand 
With the simpler specifications (equations 1, 2, or 3) the estimated income elasticity is 
between 0.86 and 1.02.  When income and price are decomposed in a specification with lagged 
demand, equation (3a), there is partial evidence for asymmetric response to changes in income 
changes and in price, and the income elasticity (1.11) is slightly higher than in the previous 
specifications. 
Notice that the income elasticity for either equations (3) or (3a) appears relatively high and 
slightly higher than unity.  In fact, the estimated response of 1.02 in equation (3) appears 
comparable to what we will estimate for the same equation in the following sections for the oil 
exporters (1.11 in Table 3), for fast growers (1.17 in Table 4), and for all others (0.93 in Table 
5).  Thus, one might be tempted to conclude that disaggregation of the non-OECD countries 
would not change the estimates of the income elasticities.  However, this conclusion would hold 
only if equation (3), which imposes the same adjustment process on price and income, is 
properly specified. 
When the lagged-adjustment coefficients are estimated separately for income and price, that 
coefficient for income is negative (results not shown) – implying faster-than-instantaneous 
adjustment to income changes.  Hence we examined a modified version of equation (4) in which 
income’s lagged-adjustment coefficient was assumed to be zero and the lagged-adjustment 
coefficient was estimated only for price.  A similar variant of equation (6) allowed for 
asymmetric response to changes in both income and price.  In both specifications, (4) and (6), the 
estimated income-elasticity was relatively low: either 0.44 or 0.52. 
The preferred specification would be equation (4), rather than equation (6).  For the latter 
equation, a Wald test did not allow us to reject the hypothesis that the decomposed-income 
coefficients were equal.  Moreover, in equation (6) none of the decomposed-price coefficients 
were statistically significant, although a Wald test did allow us to reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficients were equal. 
 
Non-OECD: Oil Demand 
The econometric results for oil were generally similar to those for energy.   For the simpler 
specifications, the estimated income elasticity ranged from 0.72 to 0.84.  When income and price 
were decomposed, in equation (3a), there was evidence of asymmetric response for income and 
perhaps for price.  The relative magnitudes of the decomposed-income coefficients were 
somewhat unexpected: the largest coefficient was for income recoveries Yrec. 
Separate estimation of the lagged-adjustment coefficients resulted in the lagged-income 
coefficient being negative (results not shown).  In a modified version of equation (6), income’s 
lagged-adjustment coefficient was assumed to be zero and the lagged-adjustment coefficient was 
estimated only for price.  There was evidence for asymmetric response to changes in both 
income and price: a Wald test allowed us to reject the hypotheses that the decomposed-income 
coefficients were equal; similarly for the decomposed-price coefficients.  Of the three 
decomposed-price coefficients, only that for Pmax was statistically significant.  The estimated 
income-elasticity was 0.53.  This equation (6) would be the preferred specification. 
Note that for both energy and oil demand, the apparent income-elasticity for all Non-OECD 
countries grouped together is relatively small: only slightly greater than 0.5.   This is no greater 
than that for the OECD countries.  Such an estimated income elasticity is surprisingly small, 
especially with reference to Figure 1, where the time-paths for the 5 Asian countries move   18 
parallel to the equi-proportional growth lines, suggesting an income elasticity that is 
approximately 1.0.    
However, these Non-OECD countries are extremely heterogeneous, as suggested in the 
scatterplots of Figure 4 above. Thus we shall cluster these countries into more homogeneous sub-
groups, so that their differing behavior may be characterized more accurately.  One natural group 
of Non-OECD countries are the Oil Exporters, who have abundant domestic resources of oil and 
gas, and whose prices for domestic consumption are often significantly below export prices.  A 
second cluster of countries that we shall examine separately is what we call the Income Growers: 
those developing countries that have had average growth in per-capita income exceeding 2% 
annually.  These countries are identified in Appendix A. 
 
 
IV.3  Non-OECD Oil Exporters 
 
Table 3.  Non-OECD Oil Exporters’ Results: 
Notes:  See Table 1. 
 
Oil Exporters: Energy Demand 
In the simplest specification, equation (1), with just income but not lagged demand, the 
income elasticity is 0.42.  When lagged demand is also included, equation (2), the income 
elasticity increases to 0.97.  However, the lagged adjustment coefficient for income (0.89) seems 
implausibly high, implying that only 11% of the adjustment to changes in income would be 
accomplished in the first year. 
With the standard Koyck-lag specification – equation (3) with both income and price -- the  
coefficients have the expected signs, although price is not significant.  In fact, for all the 
equations examined, price is never statistically significant, whether standard price or 
decomposed price is used, or whether the income lag adjustment is estimated separately from the 
price lag coefficient.  This should not be surprising for these countries, whose prices for 
domestic consumption are often significantly below export prices and little correlated with 
export prices. 
If only decomposed income is used in the specification, equation (1a), then we see evidence 
of asymmetric response: the coefficient for increases in Ymax is much larger than for the other 
two coefficients; the coefficient for Ycut is small and not statistically significant.     
When lagged demand is also included with decomposed income, equation (2a), the income 
asymmetry result is blurred.  The lagged coefficient is statistically significant, but the implied 
fuel eq. Y Ymax Ycut Yrec P Pmax Pcut Prec Income Price
energy 1 0.422 0.42 0.9208 48.359
energy 2 0.107 0.89 0.97 0.9928 4.400
energy 3 0.122 -0.020 1.11 -0.18 0.9928 4.378
energy 1a 1.67 0.11 0.74 1.67 0.9523 28.895
energy 2a 0.10 0.14 0.36 0.87 0.82 0.9932 4.132
oil 1 0.300 0.30 0.9647 14.948
oil 2 0.110 0.73 0.41 0.9873 5.274
oil 3 0.110 0.002 0.37 0.01 0.9872 5.374
oil 1a 0.97 0.09 0.14 0.97 0.9750 10.526
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speed-of-adjustment for income changes is implausibly slow, at.13 ( = 1-.87): that is, in the first 
year after the change in income, only 13% of the ultimate demand adjustment is accomplished.  
Moreover, the income coefficients have unexpected relative magnitudes: those for Ymax & Ycut 
are similar in size but that for Yrec is by far the largest.   
Which would be the best specification for energy demand?  In terms of Adjusted R
2 and 
SSR, the preferred specification would seem to be (2a), with decomposed income and lagged 
demand.  However, two aspects of this specification are troubling: the high value for the lagged 
adjustment coefficient -- implying an implausibly slow speed of adjustment to changes in income 
-- and the surprising relative magnitudes of the coefficients for decomposed income.  Hence 
none of the specifications yield results that are especially good. 
Oil Exporters: Oil Demand 
In the simplest specification with income only, equation (1), the income elasticity is 
surprisingly small, at 0.30.  With income and lagged demand, equation (2), the long-run income 
elasticity is not much larger, at 0.41.  If we also include price, equation (3), the results are no 
better.  The price coefficient has the wrong sign, although it is not statistically significant.  As 
with energy demand, the price coefficient is never statistically significant with the correct sign – 
whether standard price or decomposed price is used, or whether the lagged adjustment 
coefficient for price is estimated separately from that for income. 
In a specification with only decomposed current income, equation (1a), the results are 
asymmetric; the coefficient for increases in Ymax is much larger (0.97) than the coefficients for 
Ycut and Yrec.  A Wald test allows us to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal. 
If we decompose income and also include lagged demand in the equation, equation (2a) the 
results show asymmetric coefficients for income changes.  A Wald test allows us to reject the 
hypothesis that the three income coefficients are equal.  The long-run elasticity for increases in 
Ymax is 0.91. 
Which is the best specification for oil demand?  The preferred specification (as it was for 
energy demand) would be (2a), with decomposed income and lagged demand.  However, the two 
problematic aspects of the energy equation (2a) are not relevant for the oil equation (2a): the 
value for the lagged adjustment coefficient is smaller and thus more plausible, and the relative 
magnitudes of the coefficients for decomposed income are closer to what might be expected. 
It should be noted that the income elasticities in equations (2a) for energy and oil demand 
respectively are considerably higher than for the simpler specifications (1) or (2).  This illustrates 
the importance of a specification that allows for asymmetric response to income increases and 
decreases.  It provides support for our conjecture that ignoring the possibility of imperfectly 
income-reversible demand can cause an underestimate of the income elasticity. 
 
IV.4 Non-OECD  Income-Growers 
Another group of Non-OECD countries whose experience has been fairly homogeneous 
is the group of countries that experienced steady growth in per-capita income over this period.  
In contrast to the many “developing” countries whose income growth was at best sporadic and 
often negative, there were 14 developing countries whose average annual growth in per-capita 
income has exceeded 2% (listed in order of their per-capita-income-growth rates) -- South Korea, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Tunisia, Syria, India, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Colombia, Israel, Singapore, Malta, 
Morocco, and Bangladesh.  Two other developing countries, China and Indonesia, have also 
experienced this rate of income growth; China was excluded from this sub-group given its size 
and unique characteristics, and Indonesia was excluded because it is an Oil Exporting country.   20 
Table 4.  Non-OECD Income-Growers’ Results: 
 
Notes:  see Table 1. 
 
Non-OECD Income-Growers: Energy Demand 
In the specification with only income, equation (1), the income elasticity is 1.18.  When 
lagged demand is also included, equation (2) the income elasticity is slightly higher, at 1.23.  If 
the standard Koyck-lag specification that also includes price, equation (3), then price has the 
expected negative sign and the coefficient is statistically significant; the income elasticity is 
almost unchanged, at 1.17. 
If the above specification is modified by using decomposed price and income, equation (3a), 
then we see evidence of asymmetric response for changes in income and, perhaps, for price.  
This equation’s income elasticity, for increases in Ymax, is 1.09. 
Separate estimation of the lagged income and price coefficients yielded a negative coefficient 
for lagged income adjustment, implying a speed of adjustment that is even faster than 
instantaneous (results not shown).  Modifying that specification by assuming instantaneous 
income adjustment (that is, a zero lagged-adjustment coefficient for income) yields the most 
satisfactory results, in equation (6).  There is asymmetric response to income changes; the 
income elasticity, for increases in Ymax, is 1.08.  Thus income growth in the absence of energy 
price changes does not reduce energy intensity (energy/GDP ratio), and will increase it slightly. 
 
Non-OECD Income-Growers: Oil Demand 
For oil demand, almost regardless of the equation specification, the long-run income 
elasticity is about 1.0 – whether income is decomposed or not, whether price is included or not, 
whether price is decomposed or not, or whether the income lag coefficient is estimated 
separately or not.  This result should not be surprising in view of Figure 1, which plots the 1971-
97 time-paths of oil against income for several of these countries. 
There is evidence of asymmetric price responsiveness – not previously found for this 
group of countries, indeed for any group of developing countries.  There is also evidence of 
asymmetric income responsiveness.   
Separate estimation of the lagged income and price coefficients yielded a negative 
coefficient for lagged income adjustment, implying a speed of adjustment that is even faster than 
instantaneous (results not shown).  Modifying that specification by assuming instantaneous 
income adjustment (that is, a zero lagged-adjustment coefficient for income) yields the most 
satisfactory results, in equation (6).   
fuel eq. Y Ymax Ycut Yrec P Pmax Pcut Prec Income Price
energy 1 1.180 1.18 0.9883 6.2950
energy 2 0.228 0.82 1.23 0.9966 1.8410
energy 3 0.237 -0.029 1.17 -0.14 0.9967 1.7810
energy 3a 0.28 -0.05 0.24 -0.043 -0.016 -0.047 1.09 -0.17 0.9967 1.7240
energy 6 1.078 -0.50 0.47 -0.023 0.00 0.72 1.08 -0.08 0.9964 1.8970
oil 2 0.239 0.76 0.98 0.9970 2.1302
oil 3 0.226 -0.024 0.94 -0.10 0.9971 2.0666
oil 3a 0.34 0.14 0.29 -0.054 -0.011 -0.006 1.26 -0.20 0.9970 2.1617
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Note the similarity to results for the OECD countries.  Price is significant, although the price 
elasticities are lower than for the OECD; moreover, there is evidence of asymmetric response to 
price changes.  Income elasticities are higher for these countries than for the OECD, which is not 
surprising given the relatively low levels of energy and oil demand from which these developing 
countries started in 1971.  Finally, the speed of adjustment for income changes is considerably 
faster than the adjustment for price changes. 
These estimates of the income elasticity are consistent with the estimates made for Asian 
countries by Pesaran et al. (1998) and Galli (1998); those Asian countries considerably overlap 
the above group of Income Grower countries.  They are considerably higher than the income 
elasticities used by EIA in their International Energy Outlook 2000 – about 0.65 for energy and 
oil demand in Developing Asia excluding China. 
 
 
IV. 5   Non-OECD: Other Countries 
 
  The remaining Non-OECD countries – excluding the Oil Exporters and the Income 
Growers – were grouped together as the Other Countries.  Within this remaining group there is, 
of course, substantial heterogeneity.  But we did not attempt to identify any homogeneous 
clusters within this group. 
 
Table 5.  Non-OECD Other Countries’ Results: 
 
Notes:  see Table 1. 
 
Other Countries: Energy Demand 
In the simplest specification, with income and lagged demand (equation 2), the income 
elasticity is 0.87.  If price is also included, equation (3), the price coefficient has the expected 
sign and is statistically significant; the income elasticity is increased somewhat, to 0.93. 
If separate lagged-adjustment coefficients are estimated for price and income, that for 
income is negative (results are not shown).  With an alternative specification in which income’s 
lagged-adjustment coefficient is assumed to be zero, equation (4), we get good results.  All 
coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant.  The income elasticity is 
relatively low, at 0.5. 
If instead we use decomposed income, equation (6), the results are similar and there is 
evidence of asymmetric response to income changes.  However, a Wald test does not allow us to 
reject the hypothesis that the decomposed-income coefficients are equal.  Hence our preferred 
specification would be equation (4). 
fuel eq. Y Ymax Ycut Yrec P Pmax Pcut Prec Income Price
energy 2 0.201 0.77 0.87 0.9925 14.254
energy 3 0.214 -0.026 0.93 -0.11 0.9926 14.097
energy 4 0.501 -0.018 0.00 0.81 0.50 -0.09 0.9926 13.962
energy 6 0.71 0.46 0.44 -0.019 0.00 0.80 0.71 -0.09 0.9926 13.920
oil 2 0.142 0.84 0.90 0.9915 13.861
oil 3 0.153 -0.035 1.02 -0.23 0.9917 13.572
oil 4 0.489 -0.029 0.00 0.87 0.49 -0.22 0.9919 13.123
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Other Countries: Oil Demand 
For these countries’ oil demand the results are generally similar to those for energy 
demand.  The resulting income elasticities are similarly low – especially in comparison with 
those for the Income-Growers group of countries. 
With income and lagged demand, equation (2), the income elasticity is 0.9.  If we also 
include price, as in equation (3), all the coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant; income elasticity is about 1. 
When the lagged-adjustment coefficients are estimated separately for income and price, 
the former is negative (results are not shown).   If instead that lagged-adjustment coefficient for 
income is assumed to be zero, the resulting specification (4) provides useful results: all 
coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant. 
Using a similar specification but using decomposed income and price, equation (6), 
yields the most interesting results, with evidence of asymmetric response for both income and 
price.  The income asymmetry is unusual, although consistent with other evidence for these 
countries: the greatest demand response is to income declines
13.   The price asymmetry is more 
conventional: the greatest demand response is to increases in Pmax, with the coefficients for Pcut 
and Prec not being statistically significant. 
  For both energy and oil, these Other Countries’ income elasticity – 0.5 or less --  is much 
lower than those for the two other sub-groups of the Non-OECD.  For many of these countries, 
modern commercial fuels – especially oil – must be imported.  Due to economic difficulties 
within these countries (as evident in the slow and uneven growth in income) and their common 
practice of extensive import controls and restrictions on foreign exchange use, the very slow 
growth of energy and oil demand may not truly measure the long-run income elasticity, but 
rather reflect their governments’ decisions to limit imports of oil and energy.  Such a conjecture 
might also explain these countries’ unusual income-asymmetry for oil demand: oil demand falls 
much more when income declines than it increases when income rises.  Such income decreases 
were common in these countries, and were likely accompanied by decreases in export earnings, 
which could have prompted import controls by the government that would have impacted 
disproportionately on oil consumption restrictions rather than consumer behavior. 
 
 
IV. 6  Summary of Results for Long-run Income Elasticity of Energy & Oil Demand 
  Having described the details of the econometric results for a large number of alternative 
functional specifications of demand equations for energy and oil for several different groups of 
countries, let us now focus on the preferred specification for each.  These are listed in Table 6.  
The elasticities for income and price, as well as other important aspects of these preferred 
equations are presented in Table 7.
                                                            
13   Earlier work, in Dargay-Gately(1995, Figure 19), has suggested this possibility: that declining-income countries 
cut back on oil consumption most dramatically – especially for non-transportation uses, which on average constitute 
two-thirds of total oil demand.   23 
Table 6.  Preferred Demand Specifications for Each Region 
 
Notes:  see Table 1. 
 
Table 7.  Estimated Long-Run Elasticities for Energy and Oil Demand 
 
For all regional groupings, for both energy and oil (except for Other Countries’ energy), the 
preferred specification involves asymmetric demand response to changes in price and/or income.  
This is an important result, insofar as few articles in the literature – other than those cited above 
– allow for this possibility that the demand response to price (or income) increases and decreases 
might be asymmetric.  Yet we have shown that such asymmetry exists in the historical data: 
Wald tests on the decomposed price (or income) coefficients have allowed us to reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients are equal.  Moreover, not only does such asymmetry exist, but 
ignoring it will bias the estimated elasticities not only for that variable but also for other 
variables.  For example, wrongly specifying the demand equation as perfectly price-reversible 
will bias downward the estimated income elasticity; this result for the OECD countries has 
appeared previously (Gately, 1993) but it is worth repeating. 
It is also important to model correctly the different speeds of demand adjustment to changes 
in price and changes in income: demand adjusts faster to income changes than to price changes.   
For the OECD, income elasticity is 0.59 for energy and 0.56 for oil – when demand is 
properly specified as imperfectly price-reversible, and the lagged demand adjustment 
Country Groups Fuel Important Phenomena
Income Price
OECD Energy 0.59 -0.24 asymmetric response for price
OECD Oil 0.55 -0.60 asymmetric response for price
All Non-OECD Energy 0.44 -.01 to -0.16 asymmetric response for price, perhaps
All Non-OECD Oil 0.53 -0.18 asymmetric response for both price & income 
Non-OECD Oil Exporters Energy .82 to 1.0 - oil price not significant; asymmetric response for income
Non-OECD Oil Exporters Oil 0.91 - oil price not significant; asymmetric response for income
Non-OECD Income-Growers Energy 1.08 -0.08 asymmetric response for income & perhaps price
Non-OECD Income-Growers Oil 0.95 -0.12 asymmetric response for both price & income 
Non-OECD: Other Countries Energy .5 to .7 -0.09 apparently symmetric response for price & income
Non-OECD: Other Countries Oil 0.24 -0.25
Elasticities:
asymmetric response for both price & income; largest 
response to income declines
region fuel eq. Y Ymax Ycut Yrec P Pmax Pcut Prec Income Price
OECD energy 6 0.588 -0.025 -0.014 -0.015 0.00 0.90 0.59 -0.24 0.9967 0.7959
OECD oil 6 0.528 -0.075 -0.038 -0.048 0.06 0.88 0.56 -0.64 0.9916 1.2230
Non-OECD energy 4 0.444 -0.019 0.00 0.88 0.44 -0.16 0.9943 20.5420
Non-OECD oil 6 0.530 0.455 0.068 -0.028 -0.008 0.037 0.00 0.84 0.53 -0.18 0.9935 21.248
energy 1a 1.67 0.11 0.74 1.67 0.9523 28.895
oil 2a 0.31 0.08 0.11 0.66 0.91 0.9877 5.135
energy 6 1.078 -0.50 0.47 -0.023 0.00 0.72 1.08 -0.08 0.9964 1.8970
oil 6 0.95 0.04 0.29 -0.030 -0.003 0.019 0.00 0.75 0.95 -0.12 0.9970 2.1749
Others energy 4 0.501 -0.018 0.00 0.81 0.50 -0.09 0.9926 13.962
Others oil 6 0.237 0.697 0.159 -0.035 -0.010 0.043 0.00 0.86 0.24 -0.25 0.9920 12.900
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coefficients are estimated separately for price and income.  Failure to allow for imperfect price-
reversibility will bias downward the estimated income-elasticity. 
For the Non-OECD Oil Exporters, asymmetric income responsiveness is an important 
phenomenon: income declines have not reversed the demand growth that resulted from income 
increases.  When taken into account, the long-run elasticity with respect to increases in Ymax is 
about 0.9 for oil and 1.67 for energy.  Oil price, however, is never a statistically significant 
variable in their demand equations. 
For the Non-OECD Income Growers, the econometric results provide evidence of 
asymmetric response to price increases and decreases, and also to income increases and 
decreases.  With correctly specified equations, the income elasticity is 0.95 for oil demand and 
1.08 for energy demand. 
For Other Non-OECD Countries, the remaining heterogeneous group, the preferred 
specifications suggest that the income elasticity of demand for energy and oil are quite low: 0.5 
or smaller.  However, such estimates might be too low, and could reflect the import controls 
imposed by these countries that limit imports of oil and other modern fuels when the growth of 





Future economic growth will have important implications for energy demand and its 
effect on energy prices as well as on key global emissions levels for carbon dioxide and other 
pollutants. The estimated income elasticity is particularly important for understanding long-run 
energy demand and environmental emissions projections.  However, this parameter is relatively 
sensitive to the assumed functional relationships between energy use and prices and income. 
The results of our analysis suggest that income elasticities of energy and oil demand are 
higher than those resulting from several other recent analyses, and higher than those used by the 
US Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration in their projections of energy 
and oil demand.
14  For the OECD countries’ energy and oil demand we estimate that the long-run 
elasticity for income increases is about 0.55.  For the Non-OECD countries we estimate that this 
elasticity is 1.0 or higher.  As a result, projected future world energy and oil demands and 
carbon-dioxide emissions levels would be substantially higher, based upon our income-elasticity 




                                                            
14 Income elasticities that are significantly higher than those of EIA – and closer to those that we estimate – are used 
in the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2000.   25 
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Appendix A: List of Countries and Abbreviations 
 
   OECD     Oil Exporters     Income Growers     Other Countries 
AUS  Australia  ARE  United Arab Emirates  BGD Bangladesh  AGO  Angola 
AUT Austria  BHR  Bahrain  COL  Colombia  ARG  Argentina 
BEL  Belgium  DZA  Algeria  EGY  Egypt, Arab Rep.  BEN  Benin 
CAN Canada  ECU Ecuador  IND India  BGR  Bulgaria 
CHE Switzerland  GAB Gabon  ISR Israel  BOL Bolivia 
DNK Denmark  IDN  Indonesia  KOR  Korea,  Rep.  BRA Brazil 
ESP  Spain  IRN  Iran, Islamic Rep.  LKA  Sri Lanka  CHL  Chile 
FIN Finland  IRQ  Iraq  MAR  Morocco  CIV  Cote  d'Ivoire 
FRA France  KWT  Kuwait  MLT  Malta  CMR  Cameroon 
GBR  United Kingdom  NGA  Nigeria  MYS  Malaysia  COG Congo, Rep. 
GRC Greece  OMN  Oman  SGP Singapore  CRI  Costa  Rica 
IRL  Ireland  QAT  Qatar  SYR  Syrian Arab Republic  CYP  Cyprus 
ISL  Iceland  SAU  Saudi Arabia  THA  Thailand  DOM Dominican Republic 
ITA Italy  VEN  Venezuela  TUN  Tunisia  ECU  Ecuador 
JPN Japan          ETH  Ethiopia 
LUX Luxembourg          GHA  Ghana 
MEX Mexico          GTM  Guatemala 
NLD Netherlands          HND  Honduras 
NOR Norway          HTI  Haiti 
NZL New  Zealand          HUN  Hungary 
PRT Portugal          JAM Jamaica 
SWE Sweden          JOR Jordan 
TUR Turkey          KEN Kenya 
USA United  States          MMR  Myanmar 
          MOZ  Mozambique 
          NIC  Nicaragua 
          PAK  Pakistan 
          PAN  Panama 
          PER  Peru 
          PHL  Philippines 
          POL  Poland 
          PRY  Paraguay 
          ROM  Romania 
          SDN  Sudan 
          SEN  Senegal 
          SLV  El  Salvador 
            TTO  Trinidad and Tobago 
          TZA  Tanzania 
          URY  Uruguay 
          YEM  Yemen,  Rep. 
          ZAF  South  Africa 
            ZAR  Congo, Dem. Rep. 
          ZMB  Zambia 
          ZWE  Zimbabwe 
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HH:     What I find interesting is that the first four equations look very similar to the previous 
results, tempting one to conclude that it doesn’t make much difference.  However, once you 
differentiate the lagged adjustments (e-f) it does make a difference.  Schmalensee and the others 
ran them as a big group and did  not worry about dynamic adjustments so maybe their approach 




Comments inserted in Non-OECD Income Growers, Energy: next to last paragraph. 
In contrast with the Table 2 results for all Non-OECD countries, notice the effect of 
replacing a joint adjustment for price and income with an adjustment only for price, i.e., shifting 
from equation 3a to 6.  For the Income Growers, the income elasticity barely changes, from 1.09 
to 1.08.  Contrast this experience with that for all non-OECD countries above.  The income 
elasticity for that group falls from 1.02 to 0.52 in replacing equation 3 with equation 6.  In other 
words, when demand is specified to adjust at the same speed to changes in both price and 
income, the results from all Non-OECD look similar to those from the Income Growers and you 
would be tempted not to disaggregate the non-OECD countries.  However, when you correctly 
note that income adjusts more quickly than price for both groups, you see that the Income 
Growers are a very different group than the other countries.  
 
[DG:  I didn’t see this point, so I remade it (hopefully, increased its clarity) in the 
second paragraph under all non-OECD countries.  What is interesting is that if you 
estimate equation (3)—same adjustment lag on price and income--across all the different 
non-OECD groups, you have pretty similar income elasticities.  If you did not test for 
different adjustment lags on price and income, you would incorrectly conclude that 
disaggregation does not improve your estimates.} 
 
 
Question for Hill:  
Did SSJ or HES have results for the LDC that had relatively low income elasticities? 
 
The SSJ estimates for energy’s income elasticity ranged from –0.13 to 1.18 for the income group 
excluding the richest one.  Their carbon income elasticity ranged from –0.28 to 1.29.  Their high 
estimate appears comparable to what we estimate for fast growers.  However, I don’t think that 
we can say that they definitely understate it for the non-OECD.   
 
Although not reported, the income elasticity for carbon emissions in HES reaches its maximum 
at the lowest income group and declines thereafter (since they use income and income squared).  
When the HES estimated coefficients for the effect of income and income-squared are applied to 
the income levels in SSJ’s lowest income group, the inferred income elasticity is 0.57.   This 
seems relatively low relative to our results.   
 
TO BE DONE: 
1.  Hill: do we want to have a graph that shows asymmetric price response (like Fig.11 or 13 
in Dargay-Gately AREE 1995 paper?, or Fig.5 & 6 in Dargay-Gately Energy Economics 1995 
paper) .   Similarly for asymmetric income responsiveness? ?   {Let’s add the graphs if they help 
the explanation.  Otherwise we can refer people to earlier papers.}   29 
b 
IEA: WEO 2000: 
Price assumptions p.40, Fig.1.4: flat real prices until 2010 then slowly increasing prices for oil & 
gas until 2020 with flat coal price.  
If we compare En/Y ratios for ’97-2010, IEA projections are pretty close to ours.  If instead, ’97-
2020 is used (with gradual price increases for 2010-20 for gas & oil), then IEA has lower ratios. 
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Asafu-Adjaye, John, “The Relationship between Energy Consumption, Energy Prices and 
Economic Growth: Time Series Evidence from Asian Developing Countries”, Energy 
Economics, Vol. 22 (6), 2000, pp. 615-626. 
 
Ebohon, Obas John, “Energy, Economic Growth and Causality in Developing Countries” A Case 
Study of Tanzania and Nigeria”, Energy Policy, 1996, Vol. 24 (5), pp. 447-53. 
 